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Note to the reader: this is a paper I wrote in the summer of 2011. I shopped it around to 
a few journals, but without success. Eventually the literature on blame moved on, and I 
came to realize I would need to start completely from scratch if I ever wanted to publish a 
version of this paper. I haven’t had the heart to complete that project, but I still like the 
view articulated in this paper, so I thought I’d put it up on PhilPapers for safekeeping. 
 
 
Blame is fascinating yet elusive, and it is both of these things because it is so complex. 
Often it engages all the capacities that make our moral lives so rich, but   for this reason 
its essence is difficult to discern. It seems to have a cognitive aspect – the belief that 
someone has done something wrong, perhaps, together with the thought that the person 
has no excuse to offer – but it also seems to have an emotional aspect – anger or 
indignation at a display of disrespect, for example. And these two aspects are by no means 
unconnected: blameworthy behavior may well trigger beliefs about the appropriate 
emotional response, and perhaps only anger that is in some way tied to beliefs about 
wrongdoing will be relevant to an analysis of blame.  
In addition to beliefs and emotions, though, blame also seems to be associated 
with desires, both backward- and forward-looking. After a colleague spreads vicious 
rumors about me, I might really wish he hadn’t done that, but at the same time want him 
to recognize his wrong and apologize. And then of course there is the outside-of-the-
head aspect of blame, which manifests itself in rebukes and reprimands, accusations and 
distrust, cold shoulders and estrangement. An extreme but not uncommon case might 
run as follows: you betray my trust and remain unapologetic after I confront you, I take it 
as confirmation that you really are a bastard after all, I feel hurt and angry, I give you a 
piece of my mind, things get ugly, I slam the door behind me and we never speak again, 
though I often think of you and wish we could somehow get back to the way things were. 
A more optimistic ending has us exchange apologies and begin the long process of 
rebuilding trust and intimacy – though that ending can quickly start to sound more like a 
sappy movie than like real life. 
So, garden-variety instances of blame will involve a complex mélange of beliefs, 
desires, emotions, and actions. But which of these various aspects of the blaming scenario 
actually constitutes the blame? I’m not altogether sure that this question has an answer, 
but each element has its proponents in the philosophical literature. R. Jay Wallace (1994, 
2011), for instance, argues that the reactive emotions of resentment, indignation, and 
guilt form the essential core of blame. George Sher (2006) takes blame to include both a 
judgment of wrongdoing and a backward-looking desire that the wrong not have been 
done. Pamela Hieronymi (2004) contends that the judgment that a person has shown ill-
will can by itself carry the force of blame. T. M. Scanlon (2008) maintains that blame is 
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an adjustment in one’s intentions, expectations, and behavior toward someone who has 
done something to impair his relationship with you.  
These accounts are all subtle and insightful, and I’m inclined to think they all 
articulate some important aspect of the situations in which it is natural to use the word 
‘blame’. But there is one other aspect of these situations that tends to be overlooked, and 
which I would like to focus on here. In addition to beliefs, desires, emotions, and actions, 
blame often involves changes in the structure of the will. In what follows, I will sketch 
(though I will not insist upon) an account of blame that gives pride of place to these 
volitional changes. 
 
1. 
Any account of blame has to try to accommodate a number of intuitions about cases that 
apparently involve blame, and this proves an exceedingly difficult task because these cases 
often appear to elicit conflicting intuitions. It may of course turn out that any 
theoretically fruitful analysis of blame will have to jettison certain intuitions for the sake 
of other virtues, but before that question even arises we should take a moment to see 
what the data are. 
To begin, if it is to be morally interesting, blame will have to be distinct from 
certain sorts of “at fault” or “to blame” judgments. Both of those phrases are often used 
merely to assign causal responsibility for an unwelcome event, and in that sense we can 
blame just about anything, even inanimate objects. The rock is to blame for the crack in 
my windshield, and it’s the rainstorm’s fault that there are so many rocks on the road in 
the first place. We do assign causal responsibility to people, of course – it’s still your fault 
my platter broke, even if it was an accident – but this sort of blame is not what’s at issue, 
or at least not all of what’s at issue, in debates about free will and moral responsibility. 
But while blame is surely more than a judgment of causal responsibility, there are 
a number of other reactions to wrongdoing that deserve to be distinguished and that may 
or may not be correctly describable as blame. I’ve mentioned several already, but let’s take 
a bit of time now to go through them more slowly. For each, I’ll try to say a bit both 
about why it might, but also might not, make sense to call it blame. 
Let’s begin in the head, so to speak. One of the most natural and immediate 
reactions we might have to an instance of wrongdoing, at least if we are aware of it, is 
simply to form the belief that it occurred. (To talk of a reaction in this case sounds a bit 
odd, in fact, since believing that it occurred does not seem to be a way of reacting to the 
occurrence of an event. Perhaps the more general word ‘response’ would be better.) But 
again, if it is to be morally interesting, such a belief will have to tie the wrongdoing to the 
person who did wrong: it will be a belief, not just that some wrongdoing entered the 
world, but that she did wrong. This is a more robust way of understanding “at fault” 
judgments than mere causal responsibility: you may be at fault (in the causal 
responsibility sense) for the fact that my platter broke if its breaking is traceable to the 
movement of your body, but if you intentionally threw it onto the floor, then its breaking 
my be your fault (in this more robust sense) because it is traceable to you. What exactly is 
meant by the emphasis on the word ‘you’ here is a matter of controversy, but the 
implication is that some of your morally significant psychological capacities were involved 
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in the breaking of the platter, capacities that may even make you the sort of agent that 
you are.1 
The content of the belief in question might be specified in a number of different 
ways, and in fact may not involve a thought about wrongdoing at all, at least if that’s taken 
to be a matter of violating the principles that tell us what we owe to each other. Gary 
Watson, for example, points out that we often make judgments about the quality of each 
other’s conduct even if that conduct violates no norms of interpersonal relations, and even 
if the conduct doesn’t call for any sort of sanction. Such appraisals, according to Watson’s 
terminology, are made from the aretaic perspective, and they are an important part of our 
practices of moral responsibility.2 At their core, they are judgments that some vice or 
shoddy bit of behavior is attributable to someone in a sense robust enough to implicate 
their practical identity, their evaluative commitments. (Though David Shoemaker has 
recently argued that aretaic appraisals can be made even of aspects of an agent that are 
not responsive to or chosen in light of reasons, so the notion of ‘commitment’ here needs 
to be handled with a light touch.3  
Pamela Hieronymi (2004), on the other hand, focuses on a different sort of belief 
that nevertheless seems central to our practices of moral responsibility, namely a belief 
about the wrongdoer’s quality of will. Often what we are reacting to is the fact that 
someone has showed ill-will, either toward us or toward someone we care about. If you 
think that showing ill-will is a form of disrespect, and you think that the basic demand of 
morality is to show respect, then perhaps it will be morally wrong to act with ill-will, but 
it may still be true that what we are reacting to isn’t the fact of wrongness itself, but 
instead the quality of will. In any case, when someone does display ill-will toward us or 
those we love, a first response will be simply to believe that it has happened. 
So, one way we respond to the conduct of others is by coming to believe certain 
propositions: that the conduct is rooted in a vicious character, that someone has shown 
ill-will, that someone has done wrong. Do such beliefs constitute blame? Well, they 
certainly seem to bear some of its hallmarks. For one thing, it’s uncomfortable to be 
blamed, and similarly uncomfortable when someone thinks you’ve done wrong. In the 
process of defending the view that a judgment of ill-will can carry the sort of force 
typically associated with blame, Hieronymi makes this point forcefully: 
 
It seems quite plausible to me that standing in relations of mutual regard is of 
considerable importance to creatures like us. Thus the content of a judgment of ill 
will can carry a certain amount of force -- despite being descriptive. If it is true, 
then you no longer stand in such a relationship...a change in what you or another 
person thinks about the quality of your will, in itself, changes your relations with 
them. Insofar as it is important to stand in relations in which goodwill is 
 
1 George Sher gives a compelling account of what the emphasis on you amounts to in his 2006, ch. 3. 
2 See Watson 1996, reprinted in Watson 2004. In this article, Watson distinguishes between two “faces” of 
moral responsibility -- an aretaic face and an accountability face – and argues that they are different but 
equally valid parts of our moral responsibility practices. 
3 See Shoemaker 2011. Shoemaker argues that appraisals made from the aretaic perspective – what he calls 
judgments of attributability, following Watson – are distinct from appraisals that essentially imply the 
agent’s ability to reason. In Shoemaker’s terminology, these latter appraisals are judgments of answerability. 
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recognized, the judgment that you have shown ill will itself carries a certain force 
(Hieronymi 2004, p. 124).4 
 
For another thing, figuring out whom to blame for some untoward event seems to be a 
search that is guided by looking for a wrongdoer, and once the wrongdoer is found, the 
search is over. If we find out that Jones has been stealing from the till for selfish reasons, 
then it’s not clear that there’s anything else we need to do or feel in order to blame him. 
We’ve discovered that it’s his fault, and to believe this just is to blame him (it may seem). 
 
2. 
But there are also reasons to think that mere judgments are insufficiently robust to count 
as blame. You might think, for instance, that it is one thing to judge someone 
blameworthy and quite another to actually blame him. The account we are currently 
considering, however, threatens to conflate these two.5 Moreover, even if Hieronymi is 
right about how much we care about standing in relations of mutual regard (and surely 
she is right about this), it’s not clear that a mere judgment of ill-will or wrongdoing 
would impair such a relation. You and I might jointly commit armed robbery, and I 
might truly believe that your behavior displayed ill-will, and that you did something 
wrong, but this might nevertheless not alter my relationship with you at all, and it 
certainly seems possible that I not blame you for it. This is a worry that a judgment of 
wrongdoing is not sufficient for blame, but there is also a worry about the other direction, 
as well. Can’t I find myself in the position of unwillingly blaming someone while at the 
same time acknowledging that he has done no wrong? It seems intelligible to say, “I 
know it’s not his fault, but I blame him anyway”, even if the appropriate response to it is 
to recommend therapy. 
Finally, as many theorists have pointed out, blame seems to be an activity that one 
can appropriately engage in only if one has the standing to do so.6 In order to blame 
appropriately, one has to be in a position to do so, and often we are not in the right 
position if, say, we have performed similar actions in the past, or if we don’t stand in the 
right relationship to the wrongdoer. But if blame is just a judgment of wrongdoing, how 
could it require standing? Why would anyone need to be in any special position in order 
to appropriately believe what’s true? 
So, while we do clearly form beliefs about quality of will and make appraisals 
about bad or wrong actions, there is some reason to worry that these beliefs and appraisals 
alone can provide an adequate account of the nature of blame. Let’s consider, then, 
 
4 It’s unclear whether Hieronymi is arguing that blame just is a judgment that ill-will has been shown, or 
whether she is merely arguing that such a judgment can carry the force of blame, even if blame itself is 
something more. 
5 Perhaps this is not a bad thing. Elizabeth Beardsley makes the intriguing suggestion (discussed a bit 
further by Angela Smith (2008)) that the word ‘blameworthy’ misleadingly suggests that there is something 
wrongdoers are “worthy of”, namely blame. She instead suggests the word ‘culpable’, since, as she points 
out, it will tempt no one to speculate about what precisely it means to “culp” someone! See Beardsley 1969, 
p. 34. T. M. Scanlon also makes some remarks that seem to imply that one way of blaming someone is 
simply to judge that he is blameworthy. (See Scanlon 2008, p. 130.) But Scanlon is slippery on this point. 
6 For a particularly clear discussion of how issues of standing might affect the appropriateness of blame, see 
Smith 2007. 
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another way that we naturally respond to the actions of others. Often when what you’ve 
done concerns me or someone I care about, I’ll respond not just by coming to certain 
conclusions about your behavior, but also by acting on those conclusions. I might demand 
that you explain yourself, or tell you to knock it off, or slam a door in your face, or any 
number of other actions that match the gravity of the situation. 
There are some fruitful distinctions to be drawn between these various overt 
responses – for example, demanding an explanation seems in some sense “prior” to 
issuing a rebuke; the former seems more akin to an accusation, the latter to a 
punishment7 – but the important question for our purposes is whether they can form the 
core of an account of blame. It can be tempting to think of blame as a mild and unofficial 
form of punishment, as a mechanism for making people feel guilty and encouraging them 
to apologize and make amends.8 Moreover, conceptualizing blame in terms of actions 
taken against a wrongdoer avoids the problems that we raised for the belief account 
discussed above. If to blame someone is to respond with certain actions, then we get a 
nice distinction between blaming and judging blameworthy. It’s one thing to judge that 
you deserve to be treated in a certain way, another to treat you in that way. I can make 
the appropriate judgment without acting on it, and the other direction works, too – I can 
perform blaming actions without the corresponding judgment. Finally, whereas it seemed 
mysterious to suppose that someone might need standing in order to believe the truth, it 
seems less mysterious to suppose that an overt response might be rendered inappropriate 
by things like hypocrisy and unfamiliarity. In particular, it might be unfair for me to 
rebuke you, even if my judgment that you have done wrong is perfectly warranted.9 
 
3. 
But while judgments of wrongdoing seemed insufficient for blame, actions in response to 
wrongdoing seem unnecessary. As many theorists have pointed out, we blame many 
people who are, for various reasons, inaccessible to us. Long dead historical figures are 
the objects of our blame no less than our contemporaries, and miscreants in countries we 
will never visit and whose deeds are known to us only through the media get blamed no 
less than our next-door neighbor whose trashy house is making the neighborhood look 
bad.10 Moreover, just as it seems we can judge blameworthy without actually blaming, so 
it seems that we can blame without expressing blame. In fact, the interpersonal 
significance of actions like rebukes and demands seems to come from the fact that they 
are outward expressions of something that we think or feel. Without those thoughts and 
feelings to give it significance, a rebuke may still be uncomfortable in the way a loud 
noise is uncomfortable to hear, but it wouldn’t make us feel bad in the way we do when 
 
7 Cf. Duff 2010: “Blame begins, logically, as an accusation...failing an exculpatory explanation, what began 
as an accusation to be answered turns into a conclusory condemnation” (p. 123). 
8 Antony Duff (1991, ch. 2) does a particularly nice job of articulating this aim of expressing disapproval, 
and he calls it ‘blame’, though he qualifies his account by saying that it is an account of what it is to blame 
someone “to her face”. The qualification seems to indicate his recognition that there is more to blame (or 
another sense, at least) than the expression of disapproval. 
9 R. Jay Wallace (2010) spells out one compelling explanation for the origin of such unfairness. 
10 Many have noted this point, including J. E. R. Squires (1968). 
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we are the object of blame.11 Expressions of blame are no doubt morally important for 
various reasons – they may even form the essential core of the concept of holding 
responsible or holding accountable – but for blame itself, it looks like we need to head back 
into the head, or perhaps the heart. 
In response to wrongdoing, we not only believe things and do things, but we also 
feel things. We feel hurt, perhaps, if we have been disrespected by someone we 
considered a friend. We feel indignant about the wrongs that others endure. We feel 
angry, annoyed, frustrated, resentful, disappointed, sad, and many other things too 
nuanced to be summed up by one word. As with beliefs and actions, there are important 
distinctions to be made among the ways we respond emotionally to wrongdoing. Some of 
these feelings, for example, will come with rather robust propositional content, whereas 
others won’t. Someone who feels sad may not be sad about anything in particular – they 
just generally feel sad – but someone who feels resentful is typically resentful of someone 
for some particular injury done. Resentment is directed, we might say, in a way that 
sadness need not be.12 Perhaps relatedly, some of these feelings may be, to borrow a 
phrase from Gary Watson, “incipiently forms of communication” (Watson 1987, 
reprinted in Watson 2004, p. 230). In particular, resentment and indignation may, in the 
words of P. F. Strawson, “reflect an expectation of, and demand for, the manifestation of 
a certain degree of goodwill or regard on the part of other human beings toward 
ourselves” (Strawson 1962, reprinted in Watson 2003, p. 84). Again, frustration is 
probably not communicative in the same way. 
 So, perhaps if we focus on the subset of emotions that seems to embody a 
response to injury and a demand for regard – that is to say, Strawson’s reactive attitudes – 
we will find an adequate account of blame. To blame, on this account, is simply to feel 
one of these emotions, the central examples of which are resentment, indignation, and 
guilt. 
 Strawson himself seems to have held something like this view -- though he also 
somewhat implausibly tied the reactive attitudes to “the preparedness to acquiesce in 
[the] infliction of suffering on the offender” (Strawson 1962, as reprinted in Watson 
2003, p. 90-91)13 – but the most influential statement of it comes from R. Jay Wallace. 
According to what he calls the reactive account of responsibility, “holding people 
responsible involves a susceptibility to a range of reactive emotions, so that to blame a 
person is to be subject to one of these reactive emotions, because of what the person is 
done” (Wallace 1994, p. 75).14 
 This view has a number of virtues. Unlike the belief account, construing blame in 
terms of the reactive emotions allows us to draw a clear line between judging that 
someone is blameworthy and actually blaming them. In fact, this account allows us to say 
 
11 See also Sher 2008, chapter 5. 
12 R. Jay Wallace (1994) defends in detail a particularly compelling view of which propositions in particular 
are involved in emotions like resentment. 
13 Lawrence Stern (1974) takes issue with this part of Strawson’s discussion using the examples of King and 
Gandhi as people who likely held negative sentiments toward wrongdoers but did not want wrongdoers to 
suffer.  
14 What Wallace means by ‘holding people responsible’ here is more naturally expressed by the phrase 
‘regarding people as responsible agents’. It is a stance, not an activity. 
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– as it seems we should – that judging blameworthy and blaming can vary independently 
of one another. I might resent you without thinking you’ve done anything wrong (and so 
sign up for therapy) or I might think you’ve done something wrong without resenting you 
(and so congratulate you on a robbery well executed). Unlike the action account, the 
emotion account can accommodate unexpressed blame; even if the reactive attitudes are 
“incipiently forms of communication”, one can, at least sometimes, prevent them from 
escaping their incipience. And this in turn allows us to make sense of blaming the dead 
and the distant. The trick in constructing an adequate account of blame, Wallace tells us, 
is “to find space between two extremes…between, on the one hand, factual avowal, and 
on the other sanctioning behavior” (Wallace 2011, p. 348). The emotion account seems 
like a promising middle ground. 
 
4. 
Of course, it is not without its own difficulties. For one thing, although it is clearly 
possible to resent the dead and the distant, it’s not clear that we need be so emotionally 
exercised by their misdeeds in order to count as blaming them. Nomy Arpaly (who is 
something akin to a belief theorist about blame – see below), for example, maintains that 
“one can blame Julius Caesar for some of his actions without ever feeling anger, 
resentment, or indignation toward him” (Arpaly 2006, p. 12), and there does seem to be 
something right about this. King Henry VIII was kind of a bastard, and I blame him for -
- well, lots of things, I suppose, but I’m not going to get all worked up about it. George 
Sher raises a similar worry. He says: 
 
Blaming is something that we can do regretfully or dispassionately and that need 
not be accompanied by any rancor or withdrawal of good will...we simply do not 
have the emotional resources to muster even a twinge of hostility toward each of 
the innumerable miscreants, scoundrels, and thugs -- many of them long dead -- 
whom we blame for what we know to be their bad behavior or bad character (Sher 
2006, p. 89). 
 
Perhaps the proponent of the emotion account could respond by maintaining that we are 
not actually blaming in these cases, but instead merely just judging blameworthy. It does 
seem a bit odd, though, to say that although I think Henry VIII was a bastard, I don’t 
blame him for what he did. 
But if a judgment of blameworthiness is insufficient to count as blame, and 
actions and emotions are unnecessary, what sorts of reaction are left to help us construct 
an account of blame? Here we come to a number of hybrid accounts – that is, accounts 
that attempt to supplement the judgment of blameworthiness with some other element 
(which is neither action nor emotion) so that the combination is just robust enough, but 
not too robust, to count as blame. I won’t examine these accounts in detail, and I won’t 
subject them to serious critique, but it may be useful to see how they are similar to one 
another. I’ll mention three such accounts. 
I said above that Nomy Arpaly is a sort of belief theorist, but in fact she thinks 
that something needs to be added to a judgment of ill-will in order for it to count as 
blame. In addition, she says, the blamer needs to be “ ‘in favor’ of morality at some 
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level…He needs to be ‘for’ morality – that is, have a certain amount of moral concern 
himself” (Arpaly 2006, pp. 25-26). This extra element deals with the co-conspirators 
worry from above (and Arpaly’s own worry about whether it makes sense to say that the 
Devil blames Hitler), but it also ties blame closely with the reactive emotions, since a 
genuine concern for morality will leave one vulnerable to resentment and indignation 
when injury has been done. This seems a plausible addition to the unadorned belief 
account.15 
George Sher (2006) also makes an intriguing addition to mere belief that 
someone has done wrong. In particular, he suggests that when we blame someone, we 
also have a backward-oriented desire that the person not have done wrong. When 
someone has done wrong, our desire that they not have done so has been frustrated, and 
this frustration can lead us to feel and act in the ways that are characteristic of blame. So 
Sher also gets around the co-conspirators worry, while at the same time explaining why 
the reactive emotions often accompany (but need not accompany) blame. This also seems 
a plausible addition to the unadorned belief account.16 
Finally, T. M. Scanlon adds a bit more to the belief account than both Arpaly and 
Sher. The relevant belief, on Scanlon’s proposal, is that “[the action] shows something 
about the agent’s attitudes toward others that impairs the relations that others can have 
with him or her”, and the additional element is that one must actually make the 
modifications in “the expectations, intentions, and other attitudes that constitute 
[human] relationships” that such a belief deems appropriate (Scanlon 2008, p. 128). The 
appropriate modifications will vary depending on the particular relationship and the 
nature of the impairment, but the basic idea is that when I blame you, I recognize that 
you and I can’t just go on as before; things have changed between us. Like Arpaly’s and 
Sher’s, this account deals with the co-conspirators worry, and explains the connection to 
the reactive emotions without making them essential. 
I mention these three theorists together because they share the view that blame is 
going to have to involve some extra mental element that is neither as “hot” as an emotion 
nor as “cool” as a belief. Desires, commitments, intentions, and expectations are, perhaps, 
“just right”. I think each of these three accounts is open to potentially worrisome 
objections, but I think they are on the right track. In what follows I explore another 
aspect of our mental life that I think may serve even better as the centerpiece of an 
account of blame: the structure of the will. 
 
5. 
The central idea is this: to blame someone is to take a stand against his action and the 
motives and attitudes with which it was performed, where “taking a stand” here is to be 
understood as importantly analogous to – and perhaps even identical with – the process, 
 
15 Pamela Hieronymi (2008) also suggests, in a critique of Sher’s account of blame, that a commitment to 
morality may be what’s needed to get from judging blameworthy to blaming. This seems to represent a 
slight departure from her earlier view (if indeed she was offering a view of blame in her 2004), though I’m 
inclined to think that this is what she meant all along. 
16 Though as Angela Smith has pointed out to me in personal correspondence, Sher will have to say 
something about cases in which we seem to blame our political opponents even though we are glad about 
their downfall. 
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articulated by Harry Frankfurt, by which we alienate ourselves from or identify ourselves 
with our own motivations and attitudes and thus play a role in the construction of our 
wills.17 It is in virtue of this volitional activity, Frankfurt says, that we “create a self out of 
the raw materials of inner life” (Frankfurt 1987, reprinted in Frankfurt 1988, p. 170). To 
exclude or externalize a particular motivation is, in some sense, to come to the conclusion: 
“That’s not who I am; that’s not what I do.” I want to say something similar of blame. 
When we blame someone, we are concluding, in part: “That’s not who I am”. But we are 
also concluding: “That’s not who we are; that’s not what we do”. Blaming, then, is an 
important part of the process of self-creation, but it’s also one of the ways by which we 
create and sustain the moral community itself. 
That’s the sketch of the account I am proposing, anyway. Now let me see if I can 
articulate it a bit more clearly, and say a few things in its favor. A good way to begin is by 
reviewing our Frankfurt. 
Frankfurt’s views have evolved over time, but his main concern has been to 
articulate the role that psychological reflexivity plays in the lives of human agents. The 
fact that we can step back from our desires and endorse some (but not others) as the 
desires that we want to move us is, for Frankfurt, a very big deal. (I suppose it’s a big deal 
for all of us.) It provides the foundation from which Frankfurt endeavors to explain 
various aspects of our lives as agents: freedom of the will, moral responsibility, autonomy, 
rationality, caring, loving, the self – even the meaning of life and the origins of 
normativity. There’s no need for an exhaustive examination of these topics here, but let 
me at least say a few words about how the overall picture is meant to go. 
The basic building blocks of Frankfurt’s picture of the will are desires. To have a 
desire is, as Frankfurt puts it, to have a problem, the problem of deciding “whether to 
identify with the desire and thus validate it as eligible for satisfaction, or whether to 
dissociate [oneself] from it, treat it as categorically unacceptable, and try to suppress it or 
rid [oneself] of it entirely” (Frankfurt 2006, p. 11). It is difficult to articulate the 
mechanism by which identification or dissociation takes place – Frankfurt seems to think 
that it involves a decision of some sort, or at least a commitment that can be described as 
decisive – but the result of the process reveals “where (if anywhere) the person himself 
stands” (Frankfurt 1987, reprinted in Frankfurt 1988, p. 166). To act freely, then, is to 
act on motivations that represent your stance on the matter. Freedom is to be understood 
as a sort of synchronic coherence in the will (Frankfurt 2006, p. 19) – the agent does not 
“get in his own way”, so to speak (Frankfurt 1992, reprinted in Frankfurt 1999, p. 99). 
But there is a more robust sort of coherence that Frankfurt thinks is even more 
central to our lives: the coherence of the self over time that comes from the fact that we 
care about things – and, in particular, we care about them in a way that amounts to love. 
To care about something is, at least in part, to be “willingly committed to one’s desire” for 
that thing, where such a commitment is itself to be understood in terms of desire: one 
who cares about something “wants the desire [for that thing] to be sustained” (Frankfurt 
2004, p. 16). To love something is to care about it in a certain way – in a disinterested, 
personal way – and for it to be something about which one cannot help caring. That love 
 
17 Frankfurt has developed this line of thought in several articles and books over the past thirty years, 
starting with Frankfurt 1971. 
 10 
comes with a sort of necessity means that it specifies the limits and boundaries of one’s 
will, and thus, according to Frankfurt, “define[s] [one’s] shape as a person” (Frankfurt 
1993, reprinted in Frankfurt 1999, p. 114). There are certain things that we do, as a 
matter of contingent fact, care about in this way, and it is those things that determine 
who we are and what we should do. An essential element of living well, then, is “to 
understand what it is that we ourselves really care about, and to be decisively and robustly 
confident in caring about it” (Frankfurt 2004, p. 28). 
There is much more to be said about Frankfurt’s views, of course, but let’s return 
now to the issue of blame. The account that I am proposing takes blame to be an activity 
of the will, and with this brief exposition of Frankfurt on the table, I can be a bit more 
specific about what sort of activity it is. When we blame someone for something he has 
done, I suggest that what we are doing is making (or, perhaps, reaffirming) a decisive 
commitment against the motives and attitudes with which the performed the action. The 
situations that tend to elicit our blame are those in which someone has disregarded 
something that we care about – perhaps our family members, or ourselves, or our moral 
ideals – and blaming is our way of registering, at least to ourselves, our protest. We can 
say to ourselves, “That is not who I am.” And insofar as you and I care about the same 
things and thus have isomorphic wills, we can lodge our protest in the first-person plural: 
“That’s not who we are.” In addition to registering our protest, then, blaming is a way of 
deciding (or perhaps discovering) how to live, both with ourselves and with each other.18 
 
6. 
To help flesh out and defend the view, it may be helpful to contrast it with the alternative 
views we considered above. The most promising views seemed to be those that took 
blame to be a certain belief – that one has done wrong or shown ill-will or impaired a 
relationship -- plus some extra non-affective element – a commitment to morality, a 
backward-looking desire, a shift in one’s expectations and intentions. I have also 
suggested a non-affective element, but I’m not sure that it needs to come along with a 
belief in order to give us a satisfactory account of blame. In his book-length study of 
blame, George Sher guides his inquiry with this question: “What does blame add to the 
belief that someone has acted badly?” (Sher 2006, p. 6). But now I’m wondering: why 
think that blame needs to attach to any particular cognitive state at all, let alone one 
about bad or wrong action? 
To see what I’m getting at, consider the fact (mentioned briefly above) that 
inappropriate or unjustified blame may be something for which we seek professional help. 
Someone seeking such help might say, “I know it’s not his fault, but I blame him 
anyway”, and although there is certainly some sort of confusion going on here, it doesn’t 
seem like a conceptual confusion. Now perhaps what’s really going on in these sorts of 
cases is that the blamer “knows” on some superficial level that the man hasn’t done 
anything wrong, but on some deeper level the blamer still believes that he has. Perhaps. 
 
18 In his commentary on Frankfurt’s Tanner Lectures, Meir Dan-Cohen (2006) suggests that through 
blaming and holding each other responsible, the moral community plays an important role in drawing the 
boundaries of each person’s self. This is perhaps the converse of what I am suggesting (though they seem 
complementary and mutually supporting). 
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But it seems equally natural, I suggest, to suppose that blame is something that, on 
occasion, can float free of any beliefs about wrongdoing whatsoever. There will likely still 
be some beliefs, I suppose, but they will be minimal: a belief that some action was 
performed, perhaps. I think it is an advantage of the volitional account of blame is that it 
can allow for these sorts of cases. We may find that our wills our set against certain 
people and their behavior even though we acknowledge that nothing about the behavior 
calls for such a stance. Even more common, perhaps, are cases in which we blame 
ourselves even while acknowledging that we have done nothing wrong.19 
What about emotions of the sort that Strawson and Wallace appeal to? On the 
volitional account, the reactive emotions are not essential to blame, but they are certainly 
a natural outgrowth of it. In the typical case, blame will be a response to someone who 
has injured or disregarded something we care about, and such disregard is apt to make us 
feel resentment and indignation. As Frankfurt himself puts it: “What makes moral anger 
understandable and appropriate is that the transgression of an immoral agent consists in 
his willfully rejecting and impeding the realization of our moral ideal. In other words, he 
deliberately injures something that we love. That is enough to make anyone angry” 
(Frankfurt 2006, pp. 47-48).20 Importantly, though, we need not say that the anger itself 
is what constitutes the blame, even if it is an almost universal accoutrement. Almost 
universal, because thinking back to Henry VIII might not get us emotional, though it will 
give us an occasion to reaffirm the things that we care about. In his defense of the 
reactive account of blame, Wallace says, “To count as blaming a person, you have to be 
exercised by what they have done, and to be exercised in the relevant way just is to be 
subject to one of the reactive sentiments” (Wallace 2011, p. 358). As should be clear, I 
think the first part is exactly right, though I’d want to give a volitional account of what it 
is to be exercised in the right way. 
We also considered accounts according to which blame is an overt action of some 
sort, such as a rebuke or a demand for explanation. Again, on the volitional account, 
these actions are not essential to blame, but they are concomitants of it. One of the things 
that we care about is living in a community of like-minded (or, perhaps, like-willed) 
people, and finding out that we have done something that the others would want to 
dissociate themselves from can be a painful experience, painful enough to motivate us to 
change our attitudes and our behavior. Expressing our blame, then, will often be a good 
and natural thing to do. 
 
 
 
19 Perhaps T. M. Scanlon (2008) can also allow for cases of blame without the belief that the person has 
impaired a relationship, though it’s unclear how important it is to Scanlon the modifications that constitute 
blame occur in response to a belief about impairment. Susan Wolf (2011), however, brings up a case (about 
how her OUP editor may modify his intentions and expectations toward Wolf without blaming her) that is 
meant to cast doubt on Scanlon’s account, but I think Scanlon could respond by pointing out that the 
modifications that constitute blame must occur in response to a belief about impairment. In that case, 
though, Scanlon would no longer be able to accommodate the sort of case I discussed in the text. 
20 In this passage Frankfurt seems to adopt an affective account of blame, equating it with moral anger. He 
says, “Attributing moral blame is distinctively a way of being angry at the wrongdoer. The anger is itself a 
kind of punishment.” Frankfurt makes similar remarks in his 2002, p. 30. 
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7. 
So, we’ve seen how the volitional account can draw the two important distinctions that 
caused trouble for belief accounts and for action accounts: the distinction between 
judging blameworthy and blaming, on the one hand, and the distinction between 
blaming and expressing blame, on the other. We’ve also seen how it can accommodate 
the fact that we blame the dead and the distant without getting angry, something that the 
affective account has trouble with. In closing, let me mention a couple other advantages 
of the account. 
One is that it has a rather easy time explaining why understanding and sympathy 
tend to undermine blame. Often it happens that the more we find out about the context 
of someone’s behavior, the more we begin to think: “Well, I guess I can’t blame him for 
what he did. After all, if I were in his place, I would have done the same.” Sometimes 
what gives rise to this thought is the discovery that the person in question really hasn’t 
done anything wrong, but not always. Sometimes we recognize that the person has done 
wrong, but that, if faced with his circumstances, we would have done wrong too.21 
Recognition of this fact can lead us away from blame, and on the volitional account, this 
is because we come to find out that we do not, after all, wish to lodge the relevant sort of 
protest. We can’t sincerely say, “That’s not who I am”.22  
Another advantage is that the volitional account seems to connect naturally to an 
attractive view of forgiveness. Pamela Hieronymi (2001) has recently outlined a challenge 
for any account of forgiveness: it must articulate the way in which the person who 
forgives changes their view without giving up the judgments that (1) the act is wrong, (2) 
the wrongdoer is responsible, and (3) one has a claim against being wronged in this way. 
Hieronymi defends a view according to which resentment is a form of protest grounded 
on the judgment that the wrong behavior makes a threatening claim to one’s moral 
standing. When the wrongdoer apologizes, the behavior is no longer threatening (though 
it was still wrong), and resentment thus tends to disappear. On this view, the 
disappearance of resentment is what constitutes forgiveness. 
The volitional account of blame can offer an alternative view, however. What a 
sincere apology does, on this view, is indicate to the victim of wrongdoing that the 
offender has repudiated and dissociated himself from his behavior, so that he can now 
stand with the victim in lodging a protest against his former self. To forgive such a 
person, then, is to acknowledge that his past behavior is no longer to be attributed to the 
person that he has become through the change of heart that led to his apology. We can 
still acknowledge the wrong, but we can move on by recognizing that person for who they 
are now, as someone who has at least begun the process of pushing away from his former 
self, a process that constitutes self-blame and the first step in the complicated task of 
figuring out how to forgive oneself. 
 
 
 
21 Gary Watson (1987) points out that in extreme cases, such a thought can induce an “ontological 
shudder” at the recognition that “one’s moral self is such a fragile thing” (p. 245). 
22 I feel like there is some connection here to issues of when and how one’s standing to blame has been 
undermined (as it can be in cases of hypocrisy and complicity), but it’s unclear to me how best to spell it 
out. 
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There is more to be said in favor of – and, no doubt, against – the volitional view that I 
have sketched here, but I’ll stop here for now. At the very least, it seems to me a 
promising alternative to the other views on offer, and I must admit I find something 
strangely attractive in the admittedly obscure thought that the opposite of blame may not 
be praise, but love.  
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